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Safety Related Physics Activities in the DEBENE-FBR-Projekt
Present Status, Needs and Perspectives
ABSTRACT
The physics research and development activities in the DEBENE-Fast-Bree-
der-Projekt related to core disruptive accidents are discussed. These
activities are placed into the context of an overall plant safety concept
for a future commercial size LMFBR plant, which is strongly influenced by
construction and licensing of the prototype reactor SNR-300. This paper
starts with a presentation of the overall LMFBR (e.g. SNR-300) safety design
concept, reviews the present core disruptive accident analysis procedure for
SNR-300 and describes the present status of physics design and analysis for
the future commercial-sized SNR-1300. Based on this review key issues of
physics related safety research for core disruptive accidents are discussed
and the necessity of more research and development effort to resolve these
issues for commercial-sized plants is indicated.
Sicherheitsrelevante physikalische Aktivitäten im DEBENE-
Schnell-Brüter-Projekti
gegenwärtiger Stand, Erfordernisse und Ausblick
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Es werden die physikalischen Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten des
DEBENE-Schnell-Brüter-Projektes, kritisch erörtert, die im Zusammenhang mit
schweren hypothetischen Störfällen stehen. Diese Arbeiten werden vor dem
Hintergrund eines generellen Sicherheitskonzeptes für einen zukünftigen
kommerziellen schnellen Brutreaktor dargestellt, wobei anzumerken ist, daß
ein solches Sicherheitskonzept sehr wesentlich durch den Bau- und das
Genehmigungsverfahren des SNR-300 geprägt wird.
Dieser Beitrag beginnt mit einer Darstellung des generellen Sicher-
heitskonzeptes eines schnellen Brutreaktores (erläutert am Beispiel des SNR
300); dann folgt eine kritische Erläuterung der gegenwärtigen Vorgehensweise
zur Analyse schwerer hypothetischer Stör fälle für den SNR-300i außerdem wird
der gegenwärtige Stand der physikalischen Auslegung und Analyse eines
zukünftigen kommerziellen schnellen Brutreaktors beschrieben. Ausgehend
hiervon werden schließlich Schlüsselprobleme der physikalischen
Sicherheitsforschung für schwere hypothetische Störfälle diskutiert und es
wird die Notwendigkeit zusätzlicher Forschungs- und Entwicklungsarbeiten zur
Lösung dieser Schlüsselprobleme für große kommerzielle Brutreaktoren
aufgezeigt.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Construction and licensing of the sodium cooled prototype fast reactor
SNR-300 is the main basis for a licensable safety concept of a future
commercial size LMFBR plant SNR-1300 in the FRG. This safety design and
licensing concept strongly influences the related R&D-programmes. Any
discussion of the preaent atatus needs and future trends of safety R&D
therefore must be seen in the frame of the overall plant safety concept.
This paper deals only with safety and physics R&D activities related to core
disruptive accidents with extremely low probability of occurence.
2. LMFBR SAFETY DESIGN CONCEPT
The safety concept of SNR-300 and a future commercial size plant SNR-1300 is
based on the multiple barrier concept and on several levels of safety
design /1,2,3/. The first level of safety design prevents the occurence of
fault initiation by application_of inherent design characteristics, the
design principles of diversity and redundancy as weIl as inservice
inspection of important safety components and quality assurance during
design and construction of the plant. This assures low probsbility of
occurence for accident initiations. The second level of safety design
prevents the propagation of faults into serious core accidents by
maintaining integrity of the core and providing reliable reactivity control.
The third level assureS adequate mechanical response of the primary coolant
systems, as weIl as the inner and outer containment against extremely
unlikely severe accidents, thereby limiting the release of radioactivity to
acceptable levels (barrier concept).
2.1 Accident Prevention
On the first and second level of safety design a criterion of less than 10-6
per year for loss of coolable core geometry is the design objective. Loss of
coolable core geometry would lead to core melt down or core
destruction. This may occur if the plant protection system together with the
redundant shut down systems or the decay heat removal systems fail on demand
/2,3/. It has been shown for SNR-300 that this design objective can be met
by using a plant protection system with two diversely and independently
acting shut down systems /4,5/. The same shut down system design will also
be used for SNR-1300.
The primary shut down system drops absorber rods into the core from above by
gravity forces. The secondary shut down system pulls by use of a
precompressed spring a flexible absorber chain into the core from below.
Both systems have diverse electronic channels.
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In case of a commercial size LMFBR plant SNR-1300 four main primarY,and
secondary heat transfer chains provide for safe decay heat removal. In
addition a second diverse decay heat removal system is provided by a sodium
air emergency core cooling system which extracts heat from the reactor
outlet plenum by immersed h••t exchangers in the reactor tank. Immersed heat
exchangers will also be installed in the intermediate heat exchangers. In
case of SNR-300 similar diverse and redundant decay heat removal systems
attain a probability of shutdown heat removal breakdown of less than 10-6
per demand in case of the steam generator failure and, together with the
fact, that the steam generator failure rate is less than 1 per year, one
obtains a probability of shutdown heat removal breakdown of less than 10-6
per reactor year /6,7/. Even the complete loss of all active systems would
not lead to core damages. The decay heat would be transfered to the sodium
and will penetrate through the insulation of the still intact primary
coolant pipe into the inner containment /7,8/.
2.2 Protection Against Fault Propagation
In addition to the required high 'reliability of the safety shut down systems
it must also be assured that initiation of faults which could develop from
local blockagea in fuel elements, are counteracted directly by the plant
protection system to avoid the possibility of fault propagation and global
disturbances. E.g. local blockages in fuel elements and fuel pin failures
sre detected by individusl subassembly instrumentation (thermocouples) and
delayed neutron monitors /5/.
2.3 Primary System and Containment Design Basis
Under the above conditions severe core melt down or core disassembly
accidents for the SNR-300 can only be initiated if the plant protection
system with both shut down systems fail on demand. Consequently their
probsbility of occurence would be less than 10-6 per year for the SNR-300;
and this will also be a design requirement for the SNR-1300. Despite of this
low probability of occurence such core melt down accidents have to be
considered as a design bssis for the reactor tank and the inner and outer
containment system /1,2,3/. The reactor tank, the primary coolant and inner
containment system must withstand certain pressures and heat loads defined
from the analysis of such severe core accidents. The structural requirements
for the outer containment building are given by the design basis for
earthquakes, airplane crashes and gas cloud explosions /1,3/. The leak
tightness of the inner and outer containments is determined by the
radioactive source term characteristics of the low probability severe core
melt down accident. The outer containment consists therefore of a relatively
leak proof steel containment surrounding a reinforced concrete containment
for protection against external impacts. In case of SNR-300, the outer
containment is equipped with a ventilation system to keep a certain
underpressure in the gap between the steel and the concrete containment
/3,8/.
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Prior to a discussion of the present status of the core design and safety
analysis of a commercial size plant SNR-1300 and a subsequent discussion of
key safety phenomena it seems appropriate to present first the approach
taken for the CDA snalysis of SNR-300.
3. CORE DISRUPTIVE ACCIDENT ANALYSIS PROCEDURE FOR THE SNR-300
A detailed discussion of potential initiators for core disruptive accidents
of the SNR-300 leads to the conclusion that primary pump cosstdown with
simultaneous failure of both independent shutdown systems - the so called
LOF (loss of flow) accident - requires the most careful attention. The
removal of all 9 control rods (of the primary shutdown system) with maximum
speed (reactivity ramp of less than 4 i/sec) and the subsequent failure of
both independent shutdown systems - a so called low ramp rate TOP (transient
overpower) accident - has a much lower probability of occurance than the
LOF-accident. The following discussion will therefore. focus attention on the
LOF-accident and only a few remarks will be made about the low ramp rate
TOP-accident.
3.1 Accident Path Structure and Key Phenomena
The possible accident paths and accident phases are indicated in Fig. 1.
They are defined in a.similar way as discussed by Jackson et al /26/. It
will not be possible here to discuss in detail all of the numerous phenomena
in the various phases which are presently responsible for uncertainties in
LMFBR accident analysis; only some of the key phenomena will be briefly
discussed in section 5. These key phenomena determine whether the accident
develops a mild or energetic behavior and whether the core debris can be
contained within the primary system. For the SNR-300 these uncertainties
have been taken care of by using pessimistic assumptions (see the energetic
accident paths in section 3.2).
3.2 An~ysis of the Loss of Flow Accident for the SNR-300
The analysis concentrates on the end of life core of the Mark lA reactor
core design of the SNR-300, which has a larger energetics potential than the
fresh core /27/.
Best Estimate LOF Accident Path
-- ,~
By using best estimate parameters and modelling for the LOF analysis of the
SNR-300 (e.g. fuel axial expansion, fuel dispersal by fission gas and sodium
vapor) the accident proceeds (see the big black arrows in Fig. 1) through a
relatively mild initiating phase into a transitory phase /27/. During the
t~ansitory phase and the phase of integral material movement secondary
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Fig. 1: Phase Diagram for Core Disruptive Accidents (SNR-300)
excursions cannot be excluded but if they occur they are expected to be mild
(based on dispersive properties of core material and on incoherency
arguments for fuel movement during the transitory phase). They will promote
a mild discharge process of cOre material predominatly into the upper plenum
of the reactor vessel /34/. It has been shown /29/ that the core material
debris is permanently coolable within the reactor vessel. The mechanical
load of the reactor vessel and of the primary circuits is negligible. The
same conclusion holds for a range of parameters around the best estimate
values.
Energetic ~ Accident~
Because of still existing uncertainties for some of the key phenomena in
theoretical understanding, theoretical modelling, and experimental
verification of these models it has been considered prudent and necessary to
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use pessimistic assumptions for the accident development (energeti~a) during
the various accident phases. For the initiating phase a limiting energetic
accident path (see the small black arrow 1 in Fig. 1) has been derived by
making several rather pesaimiatic aaaumptiona (e.g. no axial fuel expansion
reactivity feedback; no fuel dispersal by fission gases, aodium vapor, and
steel vaporj instantaneoua fragmentation and mixing for fuel/aodium heat
transfer with a amall fuel particle radiua). This accident path leads into a
LOF driven TOP event /27,30/, .which was mechanistically aimulated by uaing
the SAS3D code aystem /31/. In addition energetic limiting accident patha
due to secondary excuraiona have been derived out of the tranaitory phaae
and the phaae of integral core material movement (see the amall black arrowa
2 & 3 in Fig. 1) by using peaaimistic aasumptions. For the tranaitory phaae
rather coherent slumping of intact fuel pin segments into non boiling
regions has been assumed to obtain a limiting energetic secondary excuraion,
which was mechanistically simulated by using the SAS3D code aystem /31/. For
the phase of integral core material movement coherent recompaction processes
of boiling pools and coherent slumping of remolten fuel slugs (from upper
core structure blockages) into a boiling pool have been considered /28,30/
to get limiting energetic aecondary excuraions. The initial and boundary
conditions for these latter cases were derived from best estimate SAS3D
calculations and the energetic excuraions were simulated by KADIS /32/. The
SIMMER-II code aystem /33/ although available in Karlaruhe for a mechanistic
analysis of the integral core material movement phase /34/ was intentionally
not applied for SNR-300 licensing purposea because experimental testing of
SIMMER-II for the complex phenomena involved is still not sufficient.
At the end of these energetic neutronic excursions the thermal energy
content of the molten fuel (energy above the liquidus point) is up to 5500
MJ. But one has to realize, that the other conditions (sodium content of the
core, steel temperatures, etc.) are quite different for the different cases.
The process of transforming thermal into mechanical energy is strongly
dependent on these conditions. The mechanical energy potential of the hot
molten fuel masses has been conservatively estimated by taking these
conditions into account and by considering the effect of other (partly more
effective) working fluids.
In fact, several combinations of hot fuel and one additional working fluid
(sodium, steel, fission products) have been evaluated with respect to their
mechanical energy potential /30/. In addition first mechanistic simulations
of the energetic expansion and discharge phase for SNR-type reactors with
SIMMER-II /35/, taking into account the complex processes involved, show
that the mechanical energy (kinetic energy) generated is much less (almost
one order of magnitude) than the isentropic fuel work potential. But due to
insufficient experimental testing of the SIMMER-II code for some of the
ph~nomena involved, these SIMMER results have not been introduced into the
licensing procedure of SNR-300. One can conclude that the mechanical energy
potential for all of these energetic accident paths is reasonably well
bounded by the isentropic fuel work potential, which yields maximum values
around 100 MJ, which is well below the design load limit of 370 MJ for the
SNR-300, which was set by the licensing authorities as early as 1972.
In spite of the conclusion that the primary vessel and the circuits will
withstand the mechanical load generated by these energetic excursions, two
other problems need carefull evaluation:
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1.) Core debris distribution snd long time coolability within the reactor
vessel,
2.) Contsinment loading by leaking core material (through un-tight sesls and
valves).
The first problem hss been discussed in some detail /28/ and it has been
shown that longtime coolability can be established within the reactor
vessel. Thus, the external core catcher of the SNR-300 has therefore only s
backup function.
The analysis of the second problem shows that even for these severe
sccidents the release of radioactive material will lesd to dose values below
the maximum values permitted by law /9,10/.
3.3 Some Remarks about the Low Ramp Rate Transient Overpower4ccident
The low ramp rate TOP accident has been analysed taking into account
incoherence effects of pin failure in different fuel subsssemblies /36/. The
best estimate path leads through a relatively mild initiating phase into a
phase of early shutdown with in-pIace coolability of the reator core (see
the big hatched arrows in Fig. 1). Some uncertainties related to fuel
freezing processes and blockage formation make it necessary to consider also
an accident path leading into whole core involvement (see arrow 4 in Fig.
1). The conditions reached have some similarity with the transitory phase of
an LOF accident.
4. PRESENT STATUS OF PHYSICS DESIGN AND ANALYSIS FOR SNR-1300
!wo alternative core designs are studied in parallel for SNR-1300: a
conventional core with 2 radial enrichment zones and a heterogeneous core.
The design and constraints for both core types are almost identical (e.g.
msx. nom. lin. pin power: 415 W/cm, total power: 3420 MW(th) equivalent to
about 1300 MW(e), pin and fuel element dimensions for the fissile and
fertile regions, external circumference of the radial blanket). More design
details and results of the core analysis may be found in /14,15/.
Possible advantages of heterogeneous versus conventional cores are e.g. a
larger breeding rstio, a smaller neutron fluence, ·improvements concerning
the power peaking factor and its variation during burnup, lower control and
shut down reactivity requirements and especially a reduction of the sodium
void reactivity and its possibly favorable influence on the safety behavior
of the core. More or less severe disadvantages could be a higher fissile
enrichment and inventory, larger core dimensions, difficulties with the
mechsnical and thermohydraulic behavior of the internal fertile regions
during burnup (bowing, fixed or variable orificing, thermal stripes etc.),
and a smaller Doppler reactivity effect. Often the performance of such cores
is burdened by a so called looser neutronic coupling of spatially separated
core regions (for more details see /11,12,13/).
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Some-integral values characterizing safety related nuclear properties of
these two cores are summarized in Table I. The results shown have been
derived on the basis of diffusion calculations using a ~-Z model for the
heterogeneous and an R-Z-model (confirmed by a few ~Z model results) for the
homogeneouB core.
Quantity Oimension Homog. Heterog.
reactor reactor
-
Hax.Pos.Cireulating
S2)~ Sodium Void Reaetivityl) 4.55 2.45
~ Total Cireulati~~ Sodium~c S 4.16 2.09~ Void Reaetivityc~
0"' Total Clad Stee! Loss.~
"'- Reactivity S 6.03 4.43& .:!
K
~<
10-3 Tdk/dT~ OOppler Constant wet -5.80 -3.91.~ ...~ ,
~o at 3000 K
iUi
10-3 Tdk/dT;; OOppler Con.tant dry -4.32 -2.90
at 3000 K
- Max. Pos. Cire.Sodium:J
C~ Vold Reaetlvity S - 0.90O~
.~ c Total Cire. Sodium"'~~ Void Reaetlvity S - 0.82
"'"'~~ Total Clad Steel Loss~~
:i .~ Reaetivity S - 1.42~<
~'" OOppler Constant wet 10-3 Tdk/dTc at 3000 K
-
-2.46n OOppler Constant dry
10-3 Tdk/dT~u at 3000 K - -2.06... cc_
--
l)exCluding stognant sodium between wrappers
2)1 S = 3.80'10-3 ak/k and = 3.88'10-3 ak/k for the homo and het.
reactor. respectively
Tab. 1: Important Safety Related Nuclear Characteristics of a Homogeneous
and a Heterogeneous 1300 MW(e) LMFBR Design (at End of Equilibrium
Cycle 2)
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Basically, the lower aodium void reactivity of a heterogeneoua deaign may be
a tt ributed to the increa.se in enrichment which is necessary in order to
maintain criticality of the core. The higher enrichment and the associated
increased neutron leakage into the internal fertile (blanket) regions leads
to a less steep increase of the neutron importance with increasing energy in
the region above some 100 keV. Thus, the flatter adjoint function together
with a more negative leakage term leadto a considerably less positive
sodium void reactivity for a loss of coolant perturbation in the fissile
region of a heterogeneous core. Naturally, the reduction of the sodium void
coefficient depends on the degree and kind of heterogeneity chosen and has
to be determined for each design individually. Designs which at first glance
may look quite similar may exhibit quite different sodium void reactivities.
This fact together with the ususlly weaker neutronic coup~ing and the
pronounced influence of perturbations e.g. by control rod movements stresses
the need to perform detailed studies in critical assemblies for these fairly
complicated configurations. Heterogeneous core arrangements similar to the
SNR-1300 heterogeneous core design were studied within the frame of the
BIZET-programme at Winfrith. The programme was terminated mid 1980. A
detailed analysis of the experiments is still underway. Table 11 shows the
present state of art within the SNR-project for calculated/measured integral
parameters of large LMFBR cores.
eiE SNR·300 LaraB LMFBR's 11300 MWB)
KNK·II homogenBOus hBtBrogBnBOUS
Keil 1.005·1.011 0.999·1.005
POWBr distribution
wllhin IhB corB 1.0 ± 0.04 1.0 ± 0.05 ...
BrBBdlng ratio 1.02 ± 0.06 1.04 ± 0.06
l!;;:;
.. :z
-gc::s
AbsorbBr rod =iili..
reectlvlly 0.81·1.21 0.86·1.17 "=. tci7ii!:::::!
0= ...
... -Na·vold EIIBCt
in corB cBntBr 0.75·1.25 0.9·1.1
OopplBr'BIIBct 0.82 ± 0.03 (0.82 ± 0.11
Tab. 2: Ratios of Calculation/Experiment for Reactor Physics
Parameters in Various Types of Sodium Cooled Fast Reactors
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4.1 'Calculational Tools for Heterogeneous Cores
Improved calculational tools have to be used for the analysis of
heterogeneous cores. Because of their specific complicated geometry leading
to the presence of many internal boundaries within the core region the
application of diffusion approximation is sometimes not very suitable and
may be a too crude method. Thus, transport theory may be the proper method
to choose and this choice may sometimes ,be mandatory. In addition, the
2-dimensional cyclindrical R-Z-models which are usually sufficient for the
calculation of conventional cores are only adequate for screening studies of
heterogeneous cores and possibly for the determination of their fissile
inventory, their breeding properties and rough calculations of the sodium
void reactivity. They have to be replaced by 3-dimensional hexagonal-z
models to obtain more accurate values especially for the power shape,
control rod worths and sodium-void coefficients. But presently the
application of 3-d methods is usually restricted to diffusion theory. Even
then the computer time required for accurate Na-void calculations using a
sufficient number of energy groups may be quite considerable since the
convergence behavior for heterogeneous cores is usually worse than for
homogeneous ones. Due to the increased occurence of interfaces between
regions of different material composition and the presence of these boundary
surfaces in regions of high neutron flux and importance, the validity of the
usual conventional homogenization procedures has to be considered more
carefully for a proper transition from the heterogeneous cell arrangement to
a homogenized material composition which is often used in global reactor
calculations.
4.2 Safety Analysis of SNR-1300 Cores
Preliminary results of safety analysis for the,conventional core design has
been obtained completed recently. It was performed in a manner similar to
earlier studies /16,17/ for a 2000 MW(e) LMFBR. Preliminary results are
available /18/ for the CDA initiated by a pump coast down followed by a
failure of both shut down systems. Similar studies for the heterogeneous
core design have been started but results are not available yet. A fair
copmparison is therefore not possible yet.
Since the safety aspects of a reactor design depend in a fairly complex and
complicated way on its neutronic, thermohydraulic and mechanical
characteristics it is necessary to perform a detailed safety analysis for
both alternative core designs. Only a quantitative safety analysis of the
complete accident progression for representative accidents can show the
merits of design differences and thus allows reliable conclusions on the
safety performance of the reactor. Furthermore, one should be aware that an
accident analysis approach which uses pessimistic assumptions to cover the
uncertainties in the data and theoretical modelling might not provide a
realistic comparison of homogeneous,versus heterogeneous core accident
behavior and this approach is, therefore, of limited usefulness.
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4.3 Role of Sodium Reactivity Effect in the Accident Analysis
Based on the fact that thesodium void reactivity is one of the most
important reactivity coefficients which influence the accident sequence - at
least during the initial phase of LOF initiated CDA - there is a tendency to
reduce its magnitude by design modifications. One aims at coming down from
about 4-5 $ for conventional large LMFBR cores to values close to 1 or 2 $
for heterogeneous cores. It is difficult to achieve this restriction with
reasonable design modifications for radially heterogeneous cores /12/.
However, there exist possibilities for heterogeneous core arrangements to
attain values between 2 and 3 $. Such sodium void reactivities should also
be acceptsble, becsuse the importance of the sodium void reactivity for the
core safety behavior should not be overestimated. Other effects, e.g.
positive reactivity effects by voiding of internal fertile subassemblies,
steel relocation, fuel slumping and theassociated phenomena of freezing and
blockage of coolant channels have a dominant influence in later stages of
the accident transient. These predominantly positive reactivity effects will
still play their dominant role even if the core will be designed for very
small positive - or even zero - sodium void reactivity coefficients. In
addition, the small positive sodium void coefficient of heterogeneous cores
is usually combined with a reduced Doppler reactivity of the fissile region.
The Doppler feedback reactivity associated with the temperature increase of
the fuel, however, makes a strong, negative contribution to the
power-coefficient and mainly determines (for a given reactivity ramp) the
energy release during the disassembly phase.
5. ON SOME KEY ISSUES OF SAFETY RESEARCH FOR CORE DISRUPTIVE ACCIDENTS
In section 3 and 4 the current accident analysis procedure for the SNR-300
and the present status of analyses for SNR-1300 have been explained.
Uncertainties for some of the key phenomena with respect to accident
energetics in the SNR-300 safety analysis have been treated by using
pessimistic assumptions for the accident simulation. This procedure is
practicable for the SNR-300. For large commercial LMFBR's like SNR-1300 a
similar procedure could lead to a very expensive plant design. Therefore it
is highly desirable to develop a better understanding of the key phenomena.
In this section the influence of some of the key phenomena on accident
progression will be briefly discussed and it will be explained which R&D
efforts are required for a better understanding of these phenomena.
5.1 Neutron Physics Evaluation of Accident Relevant Naterial Configurations
In .the course of the CDA analysis the reactivity and power distribution must
be determined for material configurations which deviate significantly from
that of the reactor in normal operation. These configurations are
characterized by
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cavities and streaming channels resulting from melting,
relocation and expulsion of some or all materials from portions of the
core
compacted fuel and structural material, resulting from the movement of
molten materials into neighbouring psrts of the reactor or from lateral
compaction of fuel elements •
. Experiments to verify the calculational methods for this type of confi-
gurations and in particular for the reactivity effects of fue1 slumping were
performed in ZPPR 5 - a mock-up of the Clinch River Breeder Reactor /19/ -
and in an assembly in ZPR 9 which was especially designed to test safety
related physics parameters /20/. Evaluation with both diffusion and
transport theory have shown considerable discrepancies between measurements
and calculations by non negligible amounts.
In SNEAK (critical facility at the nuclear research center Karlsruhe,
Germany), an extended series of experiments on the effect of material
movements in accidents is presently being performed (SNEAK 12), covering a
wide variety of configurations for the first time, this type of experiments
will be performed in both plate and pin geometry (Fig. 2).
The core of SNEAK 12A is constructed of plates and uses 20% and 35% enriched
uranium metal plates as fuel. The experimental program is being performed
mainly in the centrsl 16 elements of the assembly. It comprises the
following steps:
1) Introduction of cavities of varying sizes up to 8000 cm3
2) Introduction of streaming channels through the core and through core and
blanket in one and four SNEAK-elements.
3) Slumping and compaction of steel in core and blanket
4) Slumping and compaction of fuel in core and blanket
5) Simulation of molten pools in which fuel and steel are mixed or
vertically separated.
The use of SNEAK plates in the test zone allows independent changes of
concentration for fissile and fertile material, structural material and
sodium. The streaming effects for plate cells are not typical for fast
breeder pin lattices, their order of magnitude, however, can be tested by
using horizontal and vertical plate orientations.
The heterogeneity and also the composition of a fast breeder lattice is
better simulated in SNEAK 12B where the testzone consists of a Pu02U02 pin
lattice (15% Pu enrichment, 8.2 mm pin diameter). As of present planning the
rods are placed into calandrias, assuming a condition during which the
sodium voiding has already taken place. In order to allow a simulation of
various types of material movement, the pins in the 16 central elements are
vertically subdivided into 7 core sections and a top and bottom blanket
section. Pin sections'can be taken out of selected regions and be compacted
in other ones, reaching 1.5 times the original material concentrations thus
simulating material movements in vertical and horizontal directions during
slumping processes and the formation of cavitites. According to preliminary
estimates, changes of neutron streaming through the pin lattice caused by
vertical dislocation of pin sections in the envisaged experiments will bring
about only a relatively small fraction of the total reactivity effect.
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Fig. 2a: SNEAK 12A MOLTEN FOOL CONFIGURATION
emp1v tubes
370f 38 pios per element
25 pins per element (normallDading)
Fig. 2b: SNEAK 12B . TESTZONE AFTER RADIAL DISLOCATION
OF CENTRAL PINS
However, corresponding changes of the streaming properties for the radial
direction are expected to constitute the main component of the effect for
horizontal fuel movement. Therefore the use of pins for this type of
experiments is essential.
The evaluation of the experiments asks for the application of specific
transport theoretical methods. A number of methods which are important in
this context were developed at KFK in recent years. These include: One and
two dimensional transport perturbation codes /21/, collision probability
methods for plate and pin cells /22/, a cell code taking into account the
conditions at region interfaces /23/, and a new method to treat streaming
through empty channels /24/. These methods will be further developed,
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particularly in order to allow the treatment of pin geometry and of
anisotropic diffusion in all types of calculations which so far is possible
only partially. In addition, the currently used KFKINR group constant set
/25/ will be replaced by an updated, improved version taking into account
presently available evaluations of nuclear cross section data.
The test and validation of the applied methods and data in the analysis of
the critical experiments described here will establiah a more accurate and
reliable basis for the nuclear part of LMFBR safety analysis and help to
identify the needs where improvements in" data and methods could reduce the
uncertainty margins in the prediction of the LMFBR core safety behaviour.
5.2 Other Key Phenomena Requiring more R&D-effort
Apart from the mainly neutronic aspects of future safety related research
activities mentioned in"section 5.1, Table 3 shows a list of several
physical key phenomena which require intense future R&D efforts.
Table 3: Key Phenomena Requiring
More R&D Effort
PHASE Of I HTEGRAL (ORE • TRANSIE"T BEHAYIOR OF BOllll~G
MATERIAL HOVEf1EHT AND FUEUSTEEl POOLS
MILD DISCHARGE:
• SECOHDARY EXCUFlSIOHS (SPAtE
DEPEHDEHT KIHETlCS)
• STEEL VAPOR DRIVEN DISCHARGEOF eORE MATERI"l (caNTAtT
WITH SOOIUM)
[HEFlGETlC DISASS~Y • tORE ""TERIAL EXPANSION AI'ID
AND D1 SCKARGE PHASE: DISCHARGE UMDER TKE PRESEHCE
OF SODIII1
• BEHAVIOR (lF UPPER tORE STRUC-TURES DURINr. [HERGETIt DISCHARGE
OF eORE MATERIAL
POST ACCIDENT HEAT • MELT-THROU(;H OF STRUCTURES
REMOYAL PHASE:
• BEHAYIOR AKD COOLIHG OFfUEUSTEEL PARTICuLATE BEDS
IN SODIUH
Table 3: Continued
INITIATING PHASE: • AXIAL FUEL EXPANSION
• CLAD MATERIAL HELTING. MOVEMEliT,
AND FREEZIHG
• EARLY FUEL DISPERSAL IN SODIUM
velDED fUEL ELEMENTS
• fUEL PIK fAllURE, fAllURE PROPA-GATION AHD fUEL MOVEMENT IN
PARTLY VOIDEO fUEL ELEMEKTS
(DUR I KG lOF DRIVEN TOPs)
TRAKSITORY PHASE: • fUEL!STEEL PEKETRATION IHTO
AXIAL AHn RADIAL STRUCTURES
(BLOCKAGE fORMATION. REMfLTIKG)
• MELTTHROUGti OR MECHIlHICAL fAllUREOf HEXCAH WALLS
The axial fuel expansion due to fuel temperature increase has - if fully
effective - a large negative reactivity effect. The CABRI Program /38/ is
expected to provide the required experimental data.
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Clad material melting and movement, occuring separately from fuel melting
andmovement, is especially 1mportant for reactor core designs with a low
maximum positive sodium void reactivity effect (e.g. heterogeneous core
designs). This clad material movement could cause positive reactivity
effects and/or blockages above or below the active core region. The latter
effect could lead to a bottled-up pool configuration and thus complicate -
inspite of a relatively mild primary excursion - this later phase of the
accident (potential of secondary excursions). Out of pile experiments
/39,40/ at KfK and in-pile experiments /41,42,43/ have already and will be
extremely useful. In addition, improved theoretical simulation models have
been developed /44/ at KfK and were incorporated into the SAS3D code system
/45,46/.
Early fuel dispersal in sodium-voided fuel-elements is extremely important
for assuring a mild primary excursion, i.e. for avoiding a LOF driven TOP
situation. In-pile experiments /37,38,46/ contributed al ready to a better
understanding of this phenomenon. Additional experiments are planned within
a cooperative effort between SANDIA and KfK. Theoretical simulation methods
for fission gas behavior and fuel breakup/motion in sodium voided
subassemblies are under development at KfK /47,48/.
Fuel pin failure, failure propagation and fuel movement in partly sodium
voided fuel elements during LOF driven TOPs will strongly influence the
energetics of LOF driven TOP events /49/. In-pile experiments in CABRI
should provide more relevant information for these phenomena in the future.
Fuel/steel penetration into axial and radial structures together with a
possible incoherent slumping of upper core and blanket subasembly stubs
determine the accident development during the transitory phase; especially,
these phenomena determine whether or not a bottled-up pool situation will
develop. The results of reactor material freezing tests 50 indicate that the
data base is incomplete and that a more unified theoretical modeling method
is needed. A strong experimental and theoretical effort is planned at KfK.
Meltthrough or mechanical failure of hexcan-walls are also important for the
evolution of the accident during the transitory phase because blockage
formation, fuel dispersal phenomena, and failure of hexcan-walls (also for
control rod subassemblies) are competing effects and the path of the
accident depends on the outcome of this competition. Experimental and
theoretical studies with reactor-prototypic boundary conditions are needed.
Transient behavior of boiling fuel/steel pools is another key phenomenon.
Only recently a potentially adequate theoretical tool, i.e. SIMMER-II, was
developed at Los Alamos Scientific Laboratory /33/ and was adopted at KfK.
Scoping calculations by Bohl /34/ have shown an energetics potential for
bottled-up pool situations. It is necessary to evaluate critically whether
these - partly assumed - initial and boundary conditions are possible during
accident evolution of a specific reactor design. These conditions are
characterized by a bottled-up pool situation with a high inventory of mobile
fuel and the potential of coherent material movement. If such situations
cannot be avoided they have to be investigated experimentally and
theoretically.
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SIMMER analysis of energetic expansion and discharge processes /35,51/
indicate that the transformation of thermal into mechanical energy yields
dramatically reduced mechanical energies (by an order of magnitude) if
compared to the isentropic fuel work potential (isentropic expansion to the
cover gas volume). This is very encouraging, but the presence of sodium and
the question whether the upper core struetures stay intaet during the
expansion process need more attention. An experimental testing program was
reeently initiated at KfK.
If in-vessel eooling of fuel debris should be aceomplished for large
eommercial LMFBR's one needs more information on penetration and meltthrough
of struetures and on the behavior of fuel/steel partieulate beds in sodium.
This is so beeause the fuel debris distribution proeess within the reaetor
vessel depends very much on the time needed for penetration and meltthrough
of structures and on the eoolability of partieulate beds in sodium. Some
remarkable progress has been aehieved on the particulate bed cooling issue
by some in-pile experiments at SANDIA /52/. A eombined in-pile and
out-of-pile effort was reeently initiated by SANDIA and KfK.
In all aeeident phases a good knowledge of thermodynamic data for reactor
mterials (fuel, steel, sodium, fission products) is necessary, partly up to
relatively high temperatures (e.g. 5000 K). At KfK mueh effort has been put
into experimental and theoretieal work for equation of state data of fuel,
steel and sodium /53,54,55/.
6. RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS
6.1 The aeeident analysis must eonsider the eomplete path of an aeeident
starting with an initiating event, leading through several phases up to
meehanieal and/or thermal loading of the vessel, piping and containment
systems and up to permanent eooling of eore-debris and possibly release
of radioaetivity. Separate limiting eases must be eonsidered for
meehanieal loading and for thermal loading of the primary vessel and
piping system.
6.2 Some key phenomena of the later aeeident phases espeeially phenomena
which are crueial for the oeeuranee of secondary exeursions need more
attention of the experimental and theoretieal safety analysists in order
to have a more balaneed understanding of the whole aeeident path (a
benign behavior for the primary exeursion eould lead to a more
eomplieated and energetic situation for the later aeeident phases).
6.3 Cores with a low maximum void reaetivity effeet (e.g. heterogeneous
cores) should not be judged on the basis of limiting energeties aeeident
behavior of the primary excursion alone. The merits of different designs
can be judged reliably only on the basis of a eomplete, thorough and
realistie safety analysis. Espeeially, a heterogeneous eore with a low
void reaetivity worth might eneounter a relatively mild primary
exeursion, but elad material movement, which in low void worth eores
preeedes the fuel movement, eould form axial bloekages whieh might in
the later aceident phases lead to more eomplieated and possibly more
energetie situations (seeondary eritieality potential of bottled-up
pools).
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6.4 Structural behavior is not only an issue for the mechanical loading of
the vessel and piping system at the end of an excursion, it is important
in all accident phases and should receive more attention during the
accident progression period.
6.5 There is still a large number of challenging problems to be solved for
comercially sizedLMFBRs, ~hich include for example: neutron physics
evaluation of accident relevant configurations, effective equations of
state for irradiated fuel, multifield and multicomponent fluiddynamics
coupled with space dependent neutron kinetics for analysis of secondary
excursions, structural behavior during expansion of extremely hot
core-materials, entrainment of sodium into a hot expanding two phase
bubble, aerosol behavior and development of filter techniques.
6.6 A strong international cooperation in the experimental and theoretical
solution of design and safety problems for commercial-size LMFBRs would
be extremely valuable. Besides the BIZET- and RACINE-programs,
anotherrecent example is SIMMER experimental testing and application to
the later accident phases where international cooperation received more
momentum during the last year. SIMMER is considered in Germany as an
extremely flexible and usefull tool which should be further developed
and validated to improve our understanding of key phenomena and to
resolve some of the remaining important issues of core disruptive
accidents.
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